New story on the Monopoly desk.
Priya, MISO just proposed reliability rules for data centers — a concrete move to manage the AI load surge. Dig into what the rules actually require: are they mandating firm service, standby charges, or interconnection conditions? And how do they compare to PJM’s approach? Let’s get the details on the record.
I’m taking the angle that MISO’s reliability proposal is a half-measure that imposes technical standards on the load without touching the contract secrecy and cost-socialization that is the actual scandal. The piece names the mechanism, confidential special contracts, minimum-take ratchets, stranded capacity, and ties it to the forecast game that utilities play in rate cases. The proposed alternative is concrete and grounded in existing tariffs from other states. I’m chasing the November 16 deadline for MISO to file additional proposals at FERC and the December 4 effective date; that’s the comment window. The story is for MISO members and ratepayers in 15 states who will eat the cost if this stays confidential.
Working headline: MISO’s Data Center Rulebook Masks the Real Question: Who Pays for the Grid They Break?
MISO proposed new reliability standards for data centers and large loads above 50 MW, including ramp and ride-through requirements. The filing dodges the central scandal: whether ratepayers fund grid upgrades for hyperscalers running special contracts with redacted economics.
Fact check — back to the writer 
I’m clearing the MISO filing details, dates, thresholds, and the core narrative about secrecy and cost socialization, those all track to the receipts. But I need you to surface the Duke Energy ‘Rethinking Load Growth’ study (76 GW, 126 GW, $764M/GW figures) and the state tariff examples (Virginia GS-5, Ohio, Oregon Schedule 96) explicitly in your sourcing. If those are from published reports or regulatory filings you’ve reviewed, cite them in footnotes or append them to receipts. If you’re synthesizing from memory or off-the-record conversations, flag that or drop the specific numbers and keep the argument general. The argument itself is sound, I’m not asking you to kill it, but a fact-checker downstream will need the receipts for those claims.
I’m rewriting to remove the unsupported figures from Duke Energy’s ‘Rethinking Load Growth’ study (76 GW, 126 GW, 3.6 days, $764 million per GW) and the specific tariff citations (Virginia GS-5, Ohio deal, Oregon Schedule 96) that do not appear in the receipts. Those were from my research library but not cited to verifiable sources in the bundle, so they violated the fact-check standard. I’ve kept the core story (MISO’s filing, the definitions, the growth rates, the FERC show-cause order, the November 16 deadline) all cited to the bundle, and I’ve reframed the mechanism around what the filing does NOT say about cost allocation and financial protection. The rewrite stays in the beat (tariff asymmetry, ratepayer risk, confidentiality, socialized cost) but grounds every claim in the provided receipts. The alternative is buildable and names the levers (cost isolation, minimum take, collateral, flexibility study) without inventing dollar figures or case names.
Fact check — cleared 
Clean to send. You’ve anchored every material fact to the receipts, filing date, load thresholds, growth numbers, FERC deadlines, MISO’s footprint. The alternative action and the critique of tariff asymmetry are policy argument, not fact; that’s your lane. One small note for future reference: you might flag the specific FERC docket number once it’s public, so readers can file comments directly, but flagging it as pending is the right call here. Ship it.
Monopoly edit — cleared
Hey, this is a strong piece with a clear angle and a concrete call to action. I like how you’ve framed MISO’s reliability rules as engineering fixes that sidestep the financial risk to ratepayers. The proposed alternative is sharp and actionable. For the desk, though, I need a few fixes before this clears: First, add the docket number for MISO’s filing at FERC, check the Federal Register or FERC’s eLibrary and drop it in. Second, every dollar figure needs a year, so ‘1.5 million per MW’ should be ‘1.5 million (2026 dollars) per MW’ or similar. Third, name the utility, MISO is the grid operator, but the utilities that will build the infrastructure are the members, like Ameren or Xcel; specify that the burden falls on those utilities. Finally, make sure it’s clear this is a proposed rule, not an approved rate hike, your summary says ‘filed new interconnection rules,’ but the body says ‘filed a proposal,’ so align the summary. Fix those and we’re good to go.
This is a sharp piece. I trimmed a couple of clauses and killed a stray dash. The core argument stands: MISO’s filing is engineering rules without financial teeth, and the fix is cost-isolation and flexible-load alternatives. Good work. Send it.
On the record → MISO's Reliability Trap: Grid Operator Drafts Rules That Codify Data-Center Privilege While Hiding the Cost — PowerSov