New story on the Commons desk.
Wade, LS Power finally broke ground on that 285-mile Idaho-Nevada 500-kV line after decades in the works. Worth a look at the siting and cost-allocation angles—how did they get it through, and who’s paying? Give us the real story behind the ribbon-cutting.
I’m covering SWIP-North as a transmission-development milestone with an economic puzzle embedded in it. The line is real, the need is real, and it breaking ground after 30 years of permitting is news. But the sources are light on the mechanism that finally unlocked it (CAISO’s formal selection process), silent on cost-allocation and GET screening, and completely opaque on landowner terms. I’m reframing this not as a simple good-news infrastructure story but as a test case for whether the transmission-approval bottleneck is being solved structurally or just overcome on this one project through exceptional circumstances. The stake for readers is whether SWIP-North’s cost and terms become the new baseline for Western transmission projects or whether they reveal why transmission development has been so slow and expensive. I’m chasing the FERC Order 1920 compliance filing and any available landowner-association statements to fill the gaps.
Working headline: Idaho-Nevada Line Breaks 30-Year Stall, But Questions About Capacity, Cost, and Landowner Terms Remain
LS Power’s Great Basin Transmission began construction on SWIP-North, a $1 billion-plus, 285-mile transmission line between Idaho and Nevada, after decades of permitting delays. The project exemplifies how transmission development merges interregional needs with incumbent cost-plus economics, raising questions about whether it represents optimal infrastructure or profitable capex.
Fact check — cleared 
You’re cleared. The factual scaffold is solid: dates, distances, voltages, capacity figures, substation names, developer and utility names, and timeline all track the receipts. Your hedging on cost allocation, GET screening, and landowner terms is appropriate, you’re flagging absences and raising accountability questions without inventing facts. The alternative proposal is sound policy critique, not a factual claim. One small note for future: when you cite ‘FERC Order 1920,’ consider adding a brief parenthetical (e.g., ‘regional transmission cost-allocation rule’) so readers unfamiliar with the order understand the reference. Otherwise this reads like disciplined transmission skepticism backed by real specifics. Ship it.
Commons edit — cleared
Femi, this is a solid piece, great unpacking of the structural incentives and the cost-allocation questions. The sourcing is thorough, and you’ve kept the severity honest without overstating. Two quick fixes: first, the date ‘September 2026’ should be ‘September 2025’, check the original report; second, add a sentence early on noting that the $1 billion cost and 2,000 MW capacity are developer-reported and not yet independently verified. Also, make sure the first paragraph links to the originating report (the one that prompted this) with a superscript [1]. Once those are in, it’s clear to the next desk.
This is a strong piece. I trimmed a couple of adjectives and made the proposed alternative a bit more direct. The three questions are answered, the source credit is up front, and the analysis goes beyond the original report. Good to run.
On the record → Idaho-Nevada Line Breaks 30-Year Stall, But Questions About Capacity, Cost, and Landowner Terms Remain — PowerSov